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Abstract 
We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of 
voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which office and policy motivated politicians 
choose to support or oppose regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians 
flip-flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their terms, but in line with 
the preferences of single-issue minorities as they approach re-election. To assess the evidence, we 
study U.S. senators' votes on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with our 
model's predictions, election proximity has a pro-gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-
environment effect on Republican senators. These effects only arise for non-retiring senators, who 
represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate size. Also in line with our theory, 
election proximity has no impact on senators' decisions on reproductive rights, because of the presence 
of single-issue minorities on both sides. 
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1 Introduction
Passion often runs high in politics. Within an electorate, some individuals feel so pas-
sionate about a particular issue that they are willing to cast their votes based on a
candidate’s stance on that issue alone. For instance, some voters may be concerned
mostly with politicians’ stance on reproductive rights, others with their position on gun
control, environmental regulations, or gay rights.
Single-issue voters often seem to have disproportionate power relative to their size. A
striking example is provided by gun rights supporters in the United States. In the wake of
the murder of twenty children and six staff at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Decem-
ber 2012, all opinion polls showed that 90% of Americans were in favor of an expansion of
background checks on gun purchases. However, the 10% who opposed these gun controls
got its way in April 2013, when the Senate failed to pass the Manchin-Toomey amend-
ment to strengthen background checks. Even after the more recent mass-shootings in
Las Vegas in October 2017 (which left 58 people dead and hundreds wounded) and at
a high school in Florida in February 2018 (in which 17 people were killed and more
than two dozen others were wounded), new gun controls have little chance of success in
Congress, notwithstanding support from the vast majority of Americans.
In this paper, we examine how single-minded minorities can shape politicians’ de-
cisions on the issues that are salient to them. We focus on three issues: gun control,
environment, and reproductive rights. There are two main reasons for this. First, these
are prototypical secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about.
For example, based on Gallup surveys carried out between February and December 2017,
less than 0.5% of respondents ranked abortion as the most important problem facing
the country; the corresponding shares for gun control and environment are less than 2%
and 3%, respectively.1 Second, there are key differences between these issues. Two of
them are dominated by a strong minority on one side: in the case of gun control, gun-
rights supporters belonging to organizations like the National Riﬄe Association (NRA)
or Gun Owners of America (GOA) dominate an apathetic majority who favors tighter
regulations;2 in the case of the environment, there is a minority of “green” voters be-
longing to organizations like Greenpeace or the National Wildlife Federation, but no
1By comparison, more than 20% considered Dissatisfaction with government/Poor leadership as the
most important problem; the shares for Health and Immigration were around 10% and 8%.
2As pointed out by Goss (2006), there is a “missing movement” for gun control in America: in terms
of number of members and intensity of their preferences, gun-control groups like the Brady Campaign
to Prevent Gun Violence pale in comparison to gun-rights groups.
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single-issue “brown” minority.3 By contrast, in the case of reproductive rights, there
are two opposite single-issue minorities of similar size and intensity: some individuals
are strongly pro-choice and belong to organizations such as the National Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL); others are strongly pro-life and belong
to organizations such as the National Right to Life (NRLC).
We focus on one channel through which single-issue voters can shape politicians’
choices: the intensity of their policy preferences. The broad idea is that politicians only
respond to the interests of voters who make them accountable on a policy issue. Going
back to the example of gun regulations, after the Senate voted against the Manchin-
Toomey amendment on background checks, President Obama asked: “The American
people are trying to figure out: How can something have 90% support and yet not
happen?”. His answer was that the 90% who support gun controls lack the passion and
focus of the 10% who oppose them: “Ultimately, you outnumber those who argued the
other way. But they make sure to stay focused on this one issue during election time.”4
An alternative channel through which vocal minorities could affect policy choices
is money. Politicians may be willing to support policies favored by special interests
in exchange for their financial support. However, relatively little money is actually
paid to politicians on secondary policy issues such as gun control, environment, and
reproductive rights. The amount of lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions
related to these issues pales in comparison to what is spent on other policy issues, such
as Finance/Insurance, Health, or Construction.5
3Many voters dislike environmental regulations. For example, a Gallup poll in 2017 asked whether
environmental protection should be given priority even at the risk of curbing economic growth, or
if economic growth should be given priority even if the environment suffers a bit; 35% of respondents
stated that economic growth should be given priority. However, voters who are opposed to environmental
regulations tend to be against taxation and regulation more generally, rather than being focused on the
environment.
4Single-mindedness is key to understand the power of the National Rifle Associations (NRA). “The
NRA is considered by many the most powerful lobbying group in the country, despite relatively modest
financial resources and just 4 million members. (. . . ) The NRA focuses almost exclusively on gun con-
trol, which enables its leaders to doggedly pursue their legislative ends. Perhaps more important, many
NRA members are as single-minded as the organization itself. Polls often show that more Americans
favor tightening gun control laws than relaxing them, but gun rights advocates are much more likely to
be single-issue voters than those on the other side of the question. As a result, the NRA can reliably
deliver votes” (see “Why is the NRA so powerful? How the gun lobby leverages modest resources into
outsized influence”, Slate, June 29, 2012).
5The data on lobbying expenditures and campaigns contributions come from the Center for Respon-
sive Politics. As shown in Figures A-1-A-3 in the Appendix, spending on the three secondary issues
of interest represents a tiny fraction of the spending on other policy issues, both in terms of lobbying
expenditures and campaign contributions. For example, expenditures related to reproductive rights
are only 0.5% of those on Finance/Insurance and Health, and less than 5% those on Construction;
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We develop a simple theoretical model to study how single-issue minorities affect
politicians’ choices on secondary issues. Politicians serve two-period terms, at the end
of which they face re-election. During their mandates, they are called to vote in favor
or against regulations on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. They care
about remaining in office, but also have their own policy preferences, which may reflect
their party line on these issues. The three policy issues are only salient to minorities of
pro-issue or anti-issue voters.
We derive conditions under which politicians will change their voting behavior dur-
ing their terms in office. In our model, politicians who face a tradeoff between policy
preferences and re-election motives may “flip flop”, voting according to their preferences
at the beginning of their terms and in line with the preferences of a single-issue minority
when they are close to facing re-election. Election proximity should have no impact
on the voting behavior of politicians who share the same preferences as the single-issue
minority or who are not seeking re-election.
Our model predicts that the effects should be heterogeneous across secondary issues.
This is because the relative strength of the single-issue minorities, which depends on
their size and preference intensity, varies across issues. As argued above, in the case
of gun regulations, the pro-gun minority is stronger than the anti-gun minority. In the
case of environmental regulations, the pro-environment minority is stronger than its
anti-environment counterpart. Finally, in the case of regulations on reproductive rights,
there are two equally strong minorities of single-issue voters, one pro-life and one pro-
choice. Election proximity should thus have a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect on the
voting behavior of politicians who are in favor of (against) gun regulations (environ-
mental regulations); it should instead have no impact on politicians’ voting behavior on
reproductive rights.
To assess the evidence, we examine the determinants of U.S. senators’ votes on
regulations on gun rights, the environment, and reproductive rights. The staggered
structure of the U.S. Senate — in which senators serve six-year terms and one third
of them is up for re-election every two years — provides a quasi-experimental setting
to verify whether election proximity affects the decisions of incumbent politicians. For
any given vote, we can compare the behavior of senators who belong to three different
expenditures on gun regulations and environmental regulations are respectively 2% and 3.5% compared
to expenditures on Finance/Insurance or Health, and 19% and 31% compared to expenditures on Con-
struction. Looking at campaign contributions to U.S. congressmen, spending on the three single-issues
represents around 1.5% of the spending on Finance/Insurance, 3% of spending on Health, and 7% of
spending on Construction.
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“generations,” i.e. face elections at different times.6 We can also study whether election
proximity affects the stance of individual senators over time, exploiting the fact that
senators cast multiple votes on the same issue during their terms in office.
We have assembled a novel dataset that allows us to link senators’ voting behavior
on the three policy issues of interest to a wealth of characteristics of the legislators and
their constituencies. To identify the relevant votes to be included in the analysis, we
rely on lists of votes assembled by single-issue organizations.
Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of our theoretical
model. First, we show that senators flip-flop on gun control and environment — the
two issues dominated by a strong single-issue minority: election proximity increases the
likelihood that Democratic senators vote pro-gun and that Republican senators vote
pro-environment. In the case of reproductive rights, election proximity has not effect
on the behavior of senators: Democratic senators vote pro-choice, while Republican
senators vote pro-life, in line with their own preferences and with the interests of the
single-issue minority on the same side. Second, we find that Democratic (Republican)
senators flip flop on gun (environmental) regulations only if they are seeking re-election;
retiring senators always vote according to their preferences. Finally, election proximity
has a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect on Democratic (Republican) senators only when
the pro-gun (pro-environment) group in their state is of intermediate size.
These findings contribute to the debate about the shortcomings of voting as a way
to keep politicians accountable. It has been argued that, in representative democracies,
voters are limited in their ability to make politicians accountable for their policy choices.
This is because citizens have only one vote to punish or reward politicians on a bundle
of issues (Besley and Coate, 2008). Electoral accountability has thus no bite, especially
for policy issues that are of secondary importance to most voters. Contrary to this
argument, List and Sturm (2006) emphasize the role of electoral incentives in shaping
U.S. governors’ choices on state-level environmental regulations, which are of secondary
importance to most voters. They argue that electoral incentives still matter in the
presence of single-issue voters, who base their voting decisions solely on the policies
6This strategy builds on a vast literature that examines the impact of election proximity on leg-
islative behavior (e.g. Amacher and Boyes, 1978; Thomas, 1985; Glazer and Robbins, 1985; Levitt,
1996; Bernhard and Sala, 2006). Rather than focusing on senators’ choices on specific policy issues,
most of these papers analyze how election proximity affects senators’ ideological positions, captured
by summary indexes of their voting record on a broad set of issues (e.g. ADA scores, D-Nominate
and W-Nominate scores). Other studies compare senators’ voting scores to various measures of their
constituencies’ preferences and examine how election proximity affects the gap between the two.
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related to their specific issue of interest. What remained to be seen is whether electoral
accountability driven by single-issue voters is a widespread phenomenon, which spans
other policy issues and other levels of policymaking. This is exactly what our results
suggest. Our theoretical model and empirical findings show that electoral incentives
are a key determinant of politicians’ national choices on gun control, environment, and
reproductive rights. However, rather than responding to the median voter, politicians
are accountable to different single-issue minorities of voters on different policy issues.
Because they see the policy space as unidimensional, single-issue minorities give voting
back some edge in keeping politicians in check.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
In Section 3, we present our theoretical model. In Section 4, we describe the data and
variables used in our empirical analysis. Section 5 presents our empirical results. The
last section concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First it builds on the political
agency literature, which studies the determinants of a government’s responsiveness to its
citizens. Starting from the seminal contribution by Barro (1973), this literature includes
the influential studies by Besley and Case (1995) and Besley and Burgess (2002), among
many others.
Within this literature, the above-mentioned paper by List and Sturm (2006) is the
closest to ours. They develop a theoretical model in which politicians decide on the
level of public spending and environmental regulation. Voters are uncertain about the
preferences of politicians on the secondary policy issue, so incumbents engage in repu-
tation building. They show that re-election motives can lead politicians to manipulate
environmental policy to attract single-issue voters. To test their model’s predictions,
they use data on environmental expenditures across U.S. states, exploiting the fact that
some governors face binding term limits.7 Our paper goes beyond List and Sturm (2006)
by highlighting that the influence of single-issue voters is not limited to environmental
policy at the state level. We show that single-issue voters shape the behavior of politi-
7Other studies exploiting the existence of gubernatorial term limits in some U.S. states include
Besley and Case (1995) and Alt et al. (2011). Ferraz and Finan (2011) study the impact of term limits
on corruption practices in Brazilian municipalities. Conconi et al. (2014a) exploit the existence of
different types of executive term limits across countries to study the impact of electoral accountability
on inter-state conflicts.
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cians at the federal level (U.S. senators) and on several issues (environment, but also gun
control and reproductive rights). In addition, our theoretical model and identification
strategy differ from List and Sturm (2006)’s. In our model, there is no uncertainty about
the preferences of politicians and thus no scope for reputation building.8 In terms of
identification strategy, the main challenge with exploiting the existence of term limits
is the possibility of selection effects (Ferraz and Finan, 2011): politicians who serve a
second term may differ along some unobserved characteristics from those who do not
get re-elected (e.g. political ability, campaigning effort, contributions received by lobby
groups), and these characteristics may also affect their policy choices. Our identification
strategy does not suffer from this concern: to generate variation in electoral incentives,
we exploit the staggered structure of the U.S. Senate, which allows to examine how
proximity to elections affects the choices of individual politicians during their terms in
office.
The influence of single-issue voters on politicians’ choices has also been examined by
Bombardini and Trebbi (2011) and Berry and Gersen (2011). Bombardini and Trebbi
(2011) show how special interest groups can shape policy-making by donating money and
pledging the votes of their members. Berry and Gersen (2011) emphasize that single-
issue voters are more likely to turn out in elections and exploit variation in the timing
of elections (on or off-cycle) to study the effect of turnout on implemented policies.
Our empirical findings are reminiscent of the predictions of theoretical models of
political business cycles. These emphasize the importance of electoral calendars when
politicians are office motivated: close to elections, incumbent politicians manipulate
fiscal and monetary policies to signal their competence (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff,
1990). Our paper shows that proximity to election can lead office-motivated politicians
to support the interests of vocal minorities on secondary policy issues.
Our paper is also related to the literature examining the determinants of the voting
behavior of U.S. congressmen. The pioneering contribution by Peltzman (1985) studies
senators’ voting patterns on federal tax and spending. Recent contributions include Mian
et al. (2010), who examines legislators’ votes on two bills introduced in the aftermath
of the recent financial crisis, and Conconi et al. (2014b), who study how term length
8In light of our empirical findings, this difference may not be innocuous. The theoretical model
by List and Sturm (2006) can explain why politicians may override their private preferences to retain
office, e.g. why Democratic (Republican) senators seeking re-election in a state with a large pro-gun
(pro-environment) group may oppose gun regulations (support environmental regulations). However,
as it stands, it cannot provide a rationale for the fact that senators flip flop on secondary issues during
their terms in office.
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and election proximity affect politicians’ support for trade liberalization.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literatures on the political economy of the three
issues we consider. Starting from gun control, several papers focus on the effectiveness
of gun control policies on crime, often reaching conflicting conclusions (see. e.g., Lott
and Mustard 1997 and Lott 1998 vs. Duggan 2001 and Duggan et al. 2011). Another
strand of this literature examines gun trafficking in the United States (e.g. Webster et
al., 2009; Knight, 2013) or internationally (DellaVigna and La Ferrara, 2010; Dube et
al., 2013). Few studies have examined U.S. legislators’ voting behavior on gun control,
focusing on specific bills and on the role of lobbies’ contributions and constituencies’
characteristics (e.g. Langbein and Lotwis, 1990; Langbein, 1993; Kahane, 1999; Lipford,
2000). Ours is the first paper to consider a large set of gun-related votes and examine
how re-election motives affect politicians’ choices.
Concerning the political economy of enviromental policy, several studies examine
the role of lobby groups (e.g. Aidt, 1998; Conconi, 2003). Others focus on the role of
ideology (Nelson, 2002), race (Mohai and Kreshner, 2002) and gender (Fredriksson and
Wang, 2011). Herrnstadt and Muehlegger (2014) show that U.S. congressmen’s votes on
environmental regulations are affected by weather conditions in their consitituencies.
In the literature on the political economy of reproductive rights, Tatalovitch and
Schier (1993) study abortion bills in the House of Representatives, finding that the
strongest predictors are ideology and religion. Swers (1998) examines how the gender
of legislators affect their voting behavior on bills related to women’s issue. Washington
(2008) shows that parenting daughters, increases legislators’ propensity to vote liberally,
particularly on reproductive rights issues.
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 Setup
In this section, we develop a simple model of politicians’ choices to help structure our
empirical analysis. We build on standard probabilistic voting models (e.g. Enelow and
Hinich, 1982; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995; Grossman and
Helpman, 1996, Persson and Tabellini, 2001, and Stromberg, 2004).
We focus on the decisions of an incumbent politician, who serves a mandate last-
ing two periods, with elections taking place at the end of the second period. In each
period, the politician is called to vote on three policy issues: gun control regulations,
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environmental regulations, and regulations on reproductive rights. As discussed in the
introduction, a key feature of these policy issues is their “secondary” nature, i.e. the
fact that the majority of the electorate does not care intensely about them. To reflect
our empirical analysis, we will consider the three issues separately (i.e. in each period,
the incumbent votes on one piece of legislation related to each policy issue).
The politician can vote in favor (1) or against (0) a proposed law (e.g. supporting or
opposing background checks on sales at gun shows, limits on carbon dioxide emissions
for coal plants, or an extension of the gestation age limit for abortions). We denote with
st her vote on the bill in period t, and with s the vector of choices for all periods.
Voters care about the incumbent’s choices.9 In particular, their utility in period t is
W tj (s) = −αj(|sj − st|), (1)
where sj is the bliss point of group j’s voters. The parameter αj captures the importance
of the policy issue for j voters relative to a “primary” policy issue, which we do not
explicitly include in this version of the model.10 Utility is additive across periods and
there is no discounting.
For each policy issue, we suppose that there are three groups of voters: j ∈ {a, p,M}.
The groups differ in size, with M representing the majority group and a and p repre-
senting the anti-issue and the pro-issue minorities. Denoting the size of group j by nj,
we assume: (i) nM > max {na, np}, and (ii)
∑
j nj = 1. The two minorities differ in the
direction of their policy preferences, with sa = 0, sp = 1. We do not take a stance on the
direction of the preferences of the majority: depending on the case under consideration,
sM might be 0 or 1.
Voters also differ in the intensity of their policy preferences, with the minorities caring
more about the issue than the majority of the electorate (αM < 1 < min {αp, αa}). Given
the secondary nature of the policy issues, it is natural to assume that αM , the intensity of
majority voters preferences, is orders of magnitude smaller than αa and αp, the intensity
9There is a large empirical literature highlighting that congress members’ voting records affect
their re-election probabilities (e.g. the references cited in Snyder and Ting, 2005, p. 2). The literature
proposes several explanations of why voters care about congress members’ voting records. Snyder and
Ting (2003) argue that voters have to care about congress members’ voting behavior in order to limit
the influence of interest groups. Also voters care about congress members’ preferences, and their voting
behavior is informative about those preferences (Snyder and Ting 2002, 2003). Yet another reason is
that voters are unable to evaluate the effect of congressmen’s behavior on the outcome they care about,
and are thus limited to focus on the voting behavior itself (Arnold, 1990).
10We have worked out the details of an extended version of the model including a primary policy
issue, and the results are qualitatively similar.
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of minority voters’ preferences. For the sake of expositional clarity, we will work under
the assumption that αM = 0.
Besides the incumbent’s vote on these laws, voters care about other characteristics
of the politician. The total utility of voter i in group j under the incumbent politician
is
Wj =
∑
t
W tj (s) + σij + µ, (2)
with σij ∼ U [− 12φj , 12φj ] and µ ∼ U [− 12γ , 12γ ]. The parameter σij represents an individ-
ual’s ideological preference in favor of the incumbent, while µ represents her general
popularity.11,12 To make sure that there is no doubt about the forces underlying our
results, we assume that φj = φ ∀j.
At the end of the politician’s mandate, voters decide whether to re-elect her or
vote for a challenger. However, not all voters know what the politician did during her
mandate. As in Stromberg (2004), we let the variable ξtij = 1 if voter i in group j
knows what the incumbent has done in period t, and ξtij = 0 otherwise. The decision
of re-electing the politician is based on a simple rule: each voter i in group j casts the
ballot in favor of the incumbent politician if her utility under this politician has met
some minimum standard u¯j:
13
∑
t
ξtijW
t
j (s) + σij + µ ≥ u¯j. (3)
For each individual i in group j, the politician assigns a probability χtj that the voter
knows what she has done in period t. Following the principle of recency (Mullainathan
2002), we assume that voters are, on average, better informed about more recent events,
i.e. χ1j < χ
2
j . This is in line with theoretical studies emphasizing that voters suffer from a
11As usual in probabilistic voting models, there is an implicit assumption that, for any incumbent,
there are always voters that can be swung at the margin, i.e. the support of σij is large enough. However,
one could imagine situations in which, due to strong ideological divergences, some minority voters may
never vote for an incumbent, even if she adopts a stance they like. Our results continue to hold (at
least qualitatively) if we introduce such “partisan voters” in the model.
12We could allow for a group-specific bias against or in favor of the incumbent by introducing a non-
stochastic shifter, say, ψj in the distribution of σij , i.e. σij ∼ U [− 12φj −ψj , 12φj −ψj ]. This could capture
differences in the average popularity of the incumbent with different groups of voters. Introducing such
bias would not affect our results, since the incentives of the incumbent would not change at the margin.
13Our results do not rely on this specific retrospective voting rule. We can easily rewrite our model as
a forward-looking voting model, in which two candidates credibly commit to a policy platform. In such
a specification, u¯j would simply be replaced by voter i’s utility when the challenger wins the election.
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recency bias, following the so-called “what have you done for me lately?” principle (e.g.
Fiorina, 1981; Weingast et al., 1981; Ferejohn, 1986; Shepsle et al., 2009). Empirical
and experimental evidence provides support for the existence of such bias (e.g. Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Huber et al., 2012; Healy and Lenz, 2014).14 For the sake of
expositional simplicity, we assume that χtj = χ
t ∀j.
For any given µ, we can compute pij, the fraction of each group voting for the in-
cumbent politician, and then derive the probability of her re-election:
Π (s) = Pr
µ
(∑
j
njpij ≥ 1
2
)
=
1
2
+ γ
∑
j
nj
(∑
t
χtW tj (s)− u¯j
)
. (4)
This expression illustrates the costs and benefits in terms of re-election prospects of
a pro-issue vote in any given period. For instance, consider the case of a politician
pondering two possible strategies: voting anti issue in both periods – (s1, s2) = (0, 0),
and voting anti issue only in period 1 – (s1, s2) = (0, 1). The change in her probability
of re-election is proportional to naαaχ
2 − npαpχ2. Indeed, njαjχ2 is the mass of group-
j voters that can be swung by a change in the politician’s voting behavior in period
2. Thus, when naαa < npαp, the incumbent attracts more votes by appealing to the
pro-issue minority than by appealing to the anti-issue minority.
Besides her re-election prospects, the incumbent cares about the ballot she casts.
Her utility is:
U (s) = Π (s) + θω (s) , (5)
where ω (s) represents the politician’s policy preferences (e.g. Levitt, 1996; Ansolabehere
et al., 2001; Washington, 2008) and θ(≥ 0) captures the importance of policy preferences
relative to re-election motives. Alternatively, ω (s) can be interpreted as the preferences
of the politician’s party (e.g. Levitt, 1996; Snyder and Groseclose, 2000; Ansolabehere
et al., 2001).
The incumbent politician can be either in favor or against a given policy issue. We
assume that an anti-policy politician has the following preferences:
ωa (0, 0) > ωa (0, 1) = ωa (1, 0) > ωa (1, 1) , (6)
14Instead of such an informational recency bias, we could assume that voters have a preference for
the present. By discounting the policy decision in period 1, they would end up weighting more the
policy decision in period 2. The effect on the re-election rule would be equivalent to the informational
recency bias.
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while a pro-policy politician has the following preferences:
ωp (1, 1) > ωp (1, 0) = ωp (0, 1) > ωp (0, 0) . (7)
Our results are robust to incumbents having a preference for the present. They would
then prefer to implement less preferred policies in the second period. In particular, an
anti-policy politician would prefer s = (0, 1) than s = (1, 0), i.e., ωa (0, 1) > ωa (1, 0),
while a pro-policy politician would prefer s=(1, 0) than s=(0, 1), i.e., ωp (0, 1) > ωp (1, 0).
In the next subsection, it will become clear that this assumption has the same effect
on equilibrium behavior than the assumption that voters suffers from a recency bias
(informational or not).
3.2 Results
To state our results, it is useful to introduce one additional piece of notation to capture
the difference in intensity-weighted size of the two minority groups:
4h ≡ npαp − naαa,
where the super-script h refers to the issue at hand: gun-control (h = gun), environment
(h = env), and reproductive rights (h = repr).
In what follows, we characterize the behavior of the incumbent on each issue h. All
proofs are in the Appendix. We start by characterizing the behavior of an anti-issue
incumbent:
Proposition 1 The behavior of an anti-issue incumbent on issue h is uniquely defined:
(i) For 4h ≥ max{ θ(ωa(0,1)−ωa(1,1))
χ1γ
, θ(ωa(0,0)−ωa(1,1))
(χ1+χ2)γ
}, (s∗1, s∗2) = (1, 1);
(ii) For 4h ≤ min{ θ(ωa(0,0)−ωa(0,1))
χ2γ
, θ(ωa(0,0)−ωa(1,1))
(χ1+χ2)γ
}, (s∗1, s∗2) = (0, 0);
(iii) For 4h ∈
(
θ(ωa(0,0)−ωa(0,1))
χ2γ
, θ(ωa(0,1)−ωa(1,1))
χ1γ
)
, (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (0, 1).
This means that election proximity can only have a pro-issue effect on an anti-issue
incumbent. The intuition for this result is simple: an anti-issue politician would like to
vote “nay” in both periods to satisfy her policy preferences/her party’s line. However,
if the pro-issue minority is stronger than the anti-issue minority (4h > 0), voting “nay”
is costly in terms of re-election prospects, since it swings away many pro-issue voters
and attracts few anti-issue voters. In this case, the politician faces a tradeoff between
voting according to her preferences and maximizing the probability of being re-elected.
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The assumption that voters suffers from a recency bias implies that second-period policy
choices have a bigger impact on re-election chances. As a result, an anti-issue politician
may vote “nay” in the first period (in line with her policy preferences/her party line),
and “yea” in the second period (in line with the preference of the stronger single-issue
minority).
Proposition 1 also implies that an anti-issue incumbent will only flip-flop if 4h is of
intermediate size. This result is again intuitive: when the pro-issue minority is much
stronger than the anti-issue minority (case (i)), the anti-issue incumbent finds it worth-
while to support its interests in both periods; when instead the anti-issue minority is
much stronger than the pro-issue minority (case (ii)), the anti-issue incumbent can af-
ford voting according to her preferences in both periods; it is only when 4h is positive
but not too large (case (iii)), that the anti-issue politician will switch from voting “nay”
in the first period to voting “yea” in the second.
The behavior of a pro-issue incumbent can be characterized in a similar way:
Proposition 2 The behavior of a pro-issue incumbent on issue h is uniquely defined:
(i) For 4h ≥ max{ θ(ωp(1,0)−ωp(1,1))
χ2γ
, θ(ωp(0,0)−ωp(1,1))
(χ1+χ2)γ
}, (s∗1, s∗2) = (1, 1);
(ii) For 4h ≤ min{ θ(ωp(0,0)−ωp(1,0))
γχ1
, θ(ωp(0,0)−ωp(1,1))
(χ1+χ2)γ
}, (s∗1, s∗2) = (0, 0);
(iii) For 4h ∈
(
θ(ωp(0,0)−ωp(1,0))
χ1γ
, θ(ωp(1,0)−ωp(1,1))
χ2γ
)
, (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (1, 0).
This means that election proximity can only have an anti-issue effect on a pro-issue
incumbent. As in the case of an anti-issue incumbent, flip-flopping only happens when
4h is of intermediate size (case (iii)). This is because, if the pro-issue minority is strong
enough, the pro-issue politician will be able to vote “yea” in both periods (case (i)).
If instead the anti-issue minority is strong enough, the pro-issue politician will choose
“nay” in both periods (case (ii)).
Finally, we consider the behavior of an incumbent who is not seeking re-election. This
case can be captured by a parameter θ large enough so that the incumbent’s re-election
incentives are swamped by the party line (and/or her policy preferences):
Proposition 3 There is always a θ sufficiently large such that (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (0, 0) is the
equilibrium for an anti-issue incumbent, and (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (1, 1) is the equilibrium for a
pro-issue incumbent.
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3.3 Testable predictions
To map the above propositions into empirical predictions, we will examine the impact
of election proximity on the voting behavior of U.S. senators on regulations concerning
gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. As discussed before, the staggered
structure of the U.S. Senate, in which members serve six-year terms and one third is
up for re-election every two years, allows to compare the voting behavior of different
generations of senators, depending on how close they are to facing re-election.
In terms of voters’ preferences, we will work under the following assumptions, justified
above: (i) the pro-gun minority is substantially larger than the minority in favor of gun
regulations (i.e. 4gun < 0) ; (ii) the pro-environment minority is substantially larger
than the anti-environment minority (i.e. 4env > 0); and (iii) there are no substantial size
or intensity differences between the pro-life and pro-choice minorities (i.e. 4repr ' 0).
With respect to senators’ preferences, we will assume that they reflect their party
line on each issue: Democratic senators are thus pro gun control, pro environment, and
pro choice, while Republican senators are pro gun rights, opposed to environmental
regulations, and pro life. This assumption is in line with previous studies on U.S.
congressmen’s votes on these policy issues and supported by our own empirical findings
on the role of party affiliation.
We can then state our three testable predictions as follows:
Prediction 1. Election proximity should increase the likelihood that Democratic sen-
ators vote pro-gun and that Republican senators vote pro-environment; it should have
no effect on the voting behavior of Democrats and Republicans voting on reproductive
rights.
Prediction 2. Election proximity should only have a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect
on the voting behavior of Democratic (Republican) senators when they are seeking re-
election.
Prediction 3. Election proximity should only have a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect
on the voting behavior of Democratic (Republican) senators when the pro-gun (pro-
environment) minority in their state is of intermediate size.
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4 Data
To assess the validity of the model’s predictions, we have assembled a novel dataset
that allows us to link U.S. senators’ voting behavior on each policy issue to a wealth
of characteristics of the legislators and their constituencies. In this section we describe
our data, starting from our dependent variables. Table A-1 in the Appendix provides
descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our regressions.
4.1 U.S. Senators’ votes
For each of the three secondary policy issues, we have collected data on Senate roll-call
votes. Our dependent variable, Voteijvt, is equal to 1 when senator i from state j in year
t casts a pro-gun, pro-environment, or pro-choice vote v.
In order to identify the relevant votes to be included in the analysis, we rely on the
lists of votes assembled by single-issue organizations. As a result, the first year in the
sample period varies according to each organization’s voting records. For all three issues,
the end year is 2012, the last year for which we can construct all the control variables.
Votes on gun regulations are collected by Gun Owners of America (GOA), a non-
profit organization aimed at preserving and defending the Second Amendment rights of
gun owners. Since 1994, GOA has been keeping track of key gun votes in Congress,
indicating whether or not they support them.15 In our empirical analysis, we will study
the determinants of GOA-supported votes, i.e. for which it wanted congressmen to vote
“yea.”16 These include two different types: votes to strengthen the rights of gun owners,
and votes to reject gun-control legislation that threatens these rights. An example of the
first type is the vote cast on July 22, 2009 to pass an amendment introduced by Senator
John Thune (R-SD), allowing individuals to carry concealed firearms across state lines.
An example of the second type is the vote on May 12, 1999 to table an amendment
introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) to ban the private sales of firearms at
gun shows unless buyers submitted to background registration checks.17 The sample of
15The NRA publishes information on gun ratings of politicians, but does not keep track of key gun
votes in Congress.
16These votes fit the kind of decisions faced by politicians in our theoretical model, for two reasons,
capturing votes that really matter for the pro-gun minority: senators’ decisions on votes supported
by GOA are a strong predictor of their ratings by gun-rights organizations (see Bouton et al., 2014).
Moreover, they concern gun regulations on which there is a clear party divide: based on the definition
of bipartisan cosponsorship from Harbridge and Malhotra (2011), none of these votes was bipartisan.
17In the U.S. Congress, a request to “table” a pending motion is a procedure to suspend consideration
of the motion. A vote to table gun-control legislation is thus classified as a pro-gun vote by GOA.
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GOA votes covers the period 1994-2012. One of the advantages of using this source is
that we can directly identify votes that are supported by gun-rights groups: GOA lists all
the votes it supported, i.e. for which it wanted congressmen to vote “yea.”These include
two different types: votes to strengthen the rights of gun owners, and votes to reject
gun-control legislation that threatens these rights. An example of the first type is the
vote cast in the Senate on July 22, 2009 to pass an amendment introduced by Senator
John Thune (R-SD), allowing individuals to carry concealed firearms across state lines.
An example of the second type is the vote on May 12, 1999 to table an amendment
introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) to ban the private sales of firearms at
gun shows unless buyers submitted to background registration checks.18
Votes on environmental regulations are collected by the League of Conservation Vot-
ers (LCV), a non-profit organization to raise awareness on environmental issues. Since
1971 LCV keeps track of relevant roll-call votes, which are selected by a panel of ex-
perts from environmental and conservation organizations. The votes are classified under
different issues: Lands/Forests, Dirty Energy, Clean Energy, Air, Water, Wildlife, Trans-
portation, Toxics/Public Right to Know, Drilling and Other. LCV specifies if each vote
is pro or anti environment. An example of a pro-environment vote is a vote in favor of
the amendment proposed by Senator Bernard Sanders (I-VT) to eliminate $35 billion in
subsidies to the oil and gas industry, redirecting $10 billion of the savings to the Energy
Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program, a grant program that allows commu-
nities to invest in projects that reduce energy usage. An example of anti-environment
vote was on the Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolution of disapproval sponsored
by Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) in 2012, not to apply the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standard to Power Plants. The sample of LCV votes covers the period 1971-2012.
Votes on reproductive rights were collected by the National Right to Life Committee
(NRLC), the oldest and largest pro-life organization in the U.S. NRLC specifies if a
vote is pro life or pro choice. An example of the former is the vote in 2006 on the
Child Custody Protection Act sponsored by Senator John Ensign (R-NV) to prohibit
the transportation of a minor girl across state lines to obtain an abortion. An example
of the latter is the vote in 1996 on the amendment sponsored by Senator Patty Murray
(D-WA.) to require military medical facilities to provide abortion on request to military
personnel and dependents. The sample of NRLC votes covers the period 1997-2012.
We exclude from our analysis votes that are not directly related to regulations about
18In the U.S. Congress, a request to “table” a pending motion is a procedure to suspend consideration
of the motion. A vote to table gun-control legislation is thus classified as a pro-gun vote by GOA.
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the three policy issues of interest. One example for the case of gun regulations, is the vote
cast in 2001 on the amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 proposed
by Senator John McCain (D-AR). Though not directly related to gun regulations, this
vote is included in the list of GOA because it would “severely curtail the ability of
outside groups such as GOA to communicate the actions of incumbent politicians to
members and supporters prior to an election.” In the case of environment, we exclude
votes that are classified under the category “Other”. An example is the vote on the
amendment on Regulatory Rollbacks proposed by Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) in
2011. Though not directly related to the environment, this vote was of interest to the
LCV because it would “create several unnecessary new processes to complicate economic
analyses of proposed rules” and “require a lengthy periodic review process for rules at
select agencies, including the EPA, and impose mandatory budget cuts if reviews are
not conducted or are incomplete.” Finally, an example of votes on the NRLC list that
we exclude from our analysis is on the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997,
which is related to euthanasia rather than reproductive rights. Overall, our dataset
includes 14 votes on gun regulations, 397 votes on environmental regulations, and 51
votes on reproductive rights regulations.
4.2 Characteristics of legislators
Our primary interest is to examine the impact of election proximity on the voting behav-
ior of U.S. senators. As discussed above, senators serve six-year terms, with one third of
them up for re-election every two years. We define those senators who are serving the
last two years of their terms as belonging to the third generation; the second generation
captures those senators in the middle two years of their terms, while the first genera-
tion includes senators in the first two years.19 We use the indicator variables SenateGit,
G ∈ {1, 2, 3} to capture the generation to which senator i belongs in year t.
To control for party affiliation, we use the dummy variable Republicanit, which is
equal to one if senator i belongs to the Republican party.20
We also control for the role of demographic characteristics by including the variables
Femalei and Ageit in our analysis.
19We use the term generation instead of class, since the class facing re-election changes each election.
For example, Class I senators faced re-election in 2012, while class II senators did in 2008.
20We allow this variable to be time varying, since a few senators in our sample (Ben Nighthorse
Campbell, Jim Jeffords, Richard Shelby and Arlen Specter) switched from one party to the other.
Other senators switched from one of the parties to being independent (e.g. Joe Lieberman and Bernard
Sanders) and are coded according to the party they caucus with.
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To verify the role of electoral incentives, we construct the dummy variable Retiringit,
which takes value 1 during the six years of a senator’s last mandate. The data come
from Overby and Bell (2004), augmented using information from the website rollcall.com.
Retiring senators are those who voluntarily departed (for personal reasons or to pursue
other office), excluding those who were expelled or defeated in primary or general elec-
tions.
4.3 Characteristics of constituencies
We control for several characteristics of senators’ constituencies, which might affect how
they vote on the three policy issues. In all our regressions, we include the variable
Educationjt, which is equal to the share of the population of state j in year t with a
college degree. To construct this variable, we use the Current Population Survey (CPS)
for years 1994-2006 and the American Community Survey (ACS) for years 2007-2012.
Below we describe the set of additional controls that we include for each particular
issue.
Gun control
To proxy for the size of the pro-gun minority, we follow Duggan (2001) and use state-level
data on subscriptions to gun magazines. These data come from audit reports of circu-
lation from the Alliance for Audited Media. American Rifleman and American Hunter
are the two leading gun magazines in the United States.21 The variable Gun maga-
zine subscriptionsjt is the number of subscriptions to American Rifleman and American
Hunter per 1,000 inhabitants in state j and year t.22
Figure 1 shows that there is significant variation in per capita subscriptions across
states. Somewhat surprisingly, per capita subscriptions to gun magazines are higher in
some Democratic-leaning states (e.g. Oregon, Washington) than in some Republican-
leaning states (e.g. Texas, Georgia).23 This is partly due to the fact that subscriptions
21American Rifleman is the default magazine that individuals receive when joining the NRA. In
2010, American Rifleman had 53% of the total circulation of NRA magazines, followed by American
Hunter with 30% and America’s 1st Freedom with 17%. It was also the leading magazine in 49 of the
U.S. states (the exception was Wisconsin, in which American Hunter was the leading one).
22Our results are unaffected if we use subscriptions only to American Rifleman or American Hunter
to proxy for the size of the pro-gun minority.
23For each of the four Presidential elections that have occurred during our sample period, we have
computed the share of votes for the Republican candidate in each state. The correlation between this
variable and Gun magazine subscriptionsjt is 0.27.
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to gun magazines tend to be higher in rural states.24
Figure 1
Subscriptions to gun magazines
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Quartiles of Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt
The figure shows quartiles of the average number of subscriptions to American Rifleman and American Hunter magazines
per 1,000 inhabitants for the 48 contiguous U.S. states, over the period covered by GOA votes (1994-2012).
The variable Crime ratejt is the number of violent crimes (murder and non-negligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) per 1 million inhabitants
in state j and year t, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).25
Environment
Previous studies show that environmental concerns are more prominent in urban areas
(e.g. Dunlap and Allen 1976; Anderson, 2011). Following these studies, we define the
variable Share Urban Populationjt as the percentage of urban population in state j
and year t. This is constructed using data from the Decennial U.S. Census, linearly
interpolated for in-between years. We also control for the extent of air pollution in a
state. To this purpose, we use the variable Carbon Emissionsjt from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which gives CO2 emissions (in million metric tons) from fossil
fuel combustion per 10,000 inhabitants in state j and year t.
24Using information from the U.S. Census Bureau, we find that the correlation between the share of
each state’s population living in rural areas and per capita subscriptions to gun magazines is 0.39.
25We can also construct the variable Gun productionjt, using information from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Unfortunately, this is only available for the period 1998-2010, so
including it in our analysis would drastically reduce the size of the sample.
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To proxy for the size of the pro-environment minority in U.S. states, we use data from
List and Sturm (2006) on the share of population in the three largest environmental or-
ganizations (Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and National Wildlife Federation). Unfortunately,
the data is only available for one year (1987). However, Figure 2 shows that the variable
Membership in Green Organizationsj varies significantly across U.S. states.
Figure 2
Membership in green organizations
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Quartiles of Membership to Green Organizationsj
The figure shows quartiles of the percentage of the population with membership to Greenpeace, Sierra Club and the
National Wildlife Federation in 1987 for the 48 contiguous U.S. states. The data come from List and Sturm (2006).
Reproductive Rights
When studying senators’ votes on reproductive rights regulations, we include the vari-
able Religious Supportersjt to capture religious attitudes towards abortion. Religious
Supportersjt indicates the share of religious adherents to any church in state j and year
t, and comes from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA).26 The data are
available for years 1990, 2000 and 2010, so we linearly interpolate between 1990 and
2010, and use the last year available for 2011 and 2012. Figure 3 illustrates variation in
Religious Supportersjt across states.
26Adherents are defined as all members, including full members, their children, and the estimated
number of other participants who are not considered members (e.g. those regularly attending services).
19
Figure 3
Religious supporters
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Quartiles of Religious Supportersjt
The figure shows quartiles of the variable Religious Supportersjt for the 48 contiguous U.S. states, over the period covered
by NRLC votes (1997-2012).
We have also constructed the variable Abortionsjt, which is the number of reported
abortions per 1,000 inhabitants in state j and year t. Data for the this variables comes
from different sources: Henshaw and Van Vort (1990) for the years 1987-1988; Henshaw
and Van Vort (1994) for the years 1991-1992; Henshaw (1998), for the years 1995-1996;
Jones and Kooistra (2011) for 2000, 2005, 2007 and 2008; Jones and Jerman (2014) for
the years 2010-2011; and Jones and Jerman (2017) for the years 2013-2014. We use
linear interpolation to complete missing years.27
5 Empirical methodology and results
We follow two complementary strategies to identify the effect of election proximity on
senators’ voting behavior. First, we exploit variation in the voting behavior of different
senators, depending on which generation they belonged to at the time of the vote.
Second, we exploit changes in the voting behavior of the individual senators over time.
27The number of abortions reported in a given state is meant to capture the pro-choice/pro-life
preferences of citizens. However, it might also be influenced by state-level legislation on abortion. In
our regressions on U.S. Senate votes on reproductive rights, we will report parsimonious specifications
in which we omit the variable Abortionsjt and we will always include state fixed effects to account for
time-invariant state characteristics that might affect senators’ votes.
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5.1 The impact of election proximity, party differences
To assess the validity of Prediction 1, we estimate the following linear probability model:
Voteijvt = λ0 + λ1 Senate3it ×Democratit
+λ2 Senate12it × Republicanit + λ3 Senate3it × Republicanit
λ5 Xit + λ3 Wjt + δj + δt + ijvt. (8)
The dependent variable is Voteijvt, which is equal to 1 if senator i from state j votes
pro issue (i.e. pro gun, pro environment or pro choice) on vote v in year t. The main
regressor of interest is Senate3it, the dummy variable for the third generation of senators,
identifying legislators who are closest to facing re-election. For ease of exposition, we
combine the first and second generations of senators into one omitted category, i.e.
Senate12it.
28 When estimating model (8), we cluster standard errors at the senator
level.
According to the first prediction of our theoretical model, whether or not senators
“flip flop” should depend on the issue under consideration and on their party affiliation.
In the case of gun regulations, election proximity should increase the probability that
Democratic senators vote pro gun; λ1 should thus be positive and significant, while
λ2 should not be significantly different from λ3 for gun-related votes. When it comes
to environmental regulations, election proximity should instead increase the probability
that Republican senators vote pro environment; λ1 should thus be insignificant, while λ2
and λ3 should be negative and significant, with λ3 significantly smaller than λ2. Finally,
election proximity should have no impact on senators’ voting behavior on reproductive
rights, because of the presence of intense minorities on both sides of the issue; λ1 should
thus be insignificant, and λ2 should not be significantly different from λ3.
The matrix Xit includes additional controls for legislators (e.g. party affiliation, gen-
der, age), and Wjt is a matrix of state-specific characteristics (e.g. crime rate, education).
In our benchmark specifications, we also include two sets of fixed effects: δj are state
dummies, capturing time-invariant characteristics of constituencies that may affect sen-
ators’ voting behavior (e.g. rural); δt are year dummies, which allow us to account for
year-specific variables (e.g. share of Democratic senators in Congress). In alternative
specifications, we replace the year dummies with vote dummies or add interactions be-
tween state and year dummies. Notice that, when we include these interactions, we
28The results are virtually identical if we only include first-generation senators in the omitted cate-
gory: Senate3it remains positive and significant and Senate2it is not statistically significant.
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identify the effect of election proximity based on differences in the voting behavior of
senators from the same state in the same year. This allows us to account for changes in
state-level preferences on a given issue due to a local shock (e.g. a shooting rampage).
We also study the impact of election proximity by exploiting only variation in the
voting behavior of individual senators over time. In this case, we replace state dummies
with senator dummies (δi):
V oteijvt = λ0 + λ1 Senate3it ×Democratit
+λ2 Senate12it × Republicanit + λ3 Senate3it × Republicanit
λ4 Xit + λ3 Wjt + δi + δt + ijvt (9)
When estimating model (9), we identify the effect of election proximity by exploiting
changes in the voting behavior of individual senators over time. This identification strat-
egy relies on the fact that senators usually serve for long periods of time and cast several
votes on each policy issue while belonging to different generations. The interpretation
(and expected signs) of the key variables of interest are the same as for model (8). In
these regressions, we cluster standard errors at the senator level.
Tables 1-3 present the results of estimating models (8) and (9) for each of the three
policy issues. The various specifications reported in each table differ in terms of the
regressors and fixed effects that we include, or the econometric methodology that we
employ, but they all provide strong support for the first prediction of our model. Focusing
first on our key regressors, we see that the estimated coefficients λ1, λ2 and λ3 match
the expected sign and significance.
The estimates in Table 1 confirm that Democratic senators are more likely to vote
pro gun as they approach re-election (the coefficient of the interaction variable Senate3it
× Democratit is always positive and significant). By contrast, Republican senators do
not change their voting behavior during their terms (the test at the bottom of the table
is never significant). These results are in line with our prediction that the presence of
a strong minority of gun-rights activists can make Democrats vote against their own
preferences when they are close to re-election. Senator Tom Harking (D-IA) provides an
example of a Democrat who flip-flopped on gun control: he cast 11 votes on gun-related
legislation (4 in the 105th Congress, 4 in the 106th, 1 in the 109th, 1 in 110th, and 3 in
111th) and only voted pro gun once during the 110th Congress (in 2008), the only time
in which a vote occurred when he belonged to the third generation of senators.
In terms of magnitude, the effect is very stable across specifications. When comparing
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across different senators, Democrats are between 6.7 and 8.4 percentage points more
likely to vote pro gun in the last two years of their mandates. This effect is slightly larger
(i.e. around 10 percentage points) when we only exploit variation in the voting behavior
of individual senators over time. As expected, Republican senators are significantly
more likely to vote pro gun, but their behavior does not change as they get closer to
re-election.
Table 1
The impact of election proximity on votes on gun regulations,
party differences
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit 0.069* 0.070* 0.067* 0.084** 0.101** 0.101** 0.097**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Senate3it× Republicanit 0.461*** 0.459*** 0.459*** 0.470*** 0.269*** 0.263*** 0.260***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.064) (0.085) (0.093) (0.093)
Senate12it× Republicanit 0.430*** 0.431*** 0.431*** 0.442*** 0.238*** 0.237** 0.234**
(0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.061) (0.084) (0.092) (0.092)
Malei 0.079 0.081 0.082 0.054
(0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.060)
Ageit -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 0.010 0.009 -0.015 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Violent Crime Ratejt 0.000* 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Educationjt -0.008 -0.008 -0.019* -0.019*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 1,363 1,363 1,363 1,363 1,363 1,363 1,363
R-squared 0.588 0.590 0.644 0.692 0.226 0.233 0.352
Test Senate3it× Republicanit = 0.122 0.147 0.148 0.315 0.212 0.294 0.296
Senate12it× Republicanit (p-value)
Columns show coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when
senator i from state j voted pro gun on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1994-2012. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Concerning the auxiliary controls, the results of Table 1 indicate that older legislators
are less likely to vote pro gun. Our specifications always include state fixed effects,
which makes it hard to identify the role of constituency characteristics. Nevertheless, the
coefficients of the variables Educationjt and Violent Crime Ratejt suggest that an increase
in the education of their electorate increases senators’ support for gun regulations, while
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an increase in crime rate in their constituency has the opposite effect.29
Table 2
The impact of election proximity on votes on environmental regulations,
party differences
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Senate3it× Republicanit -0.365*** -0.370*** -0.370*** -0.372*** -0.247*** -0.247*** -0.249***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062)
Senate12it× Republicanit -0.389*** -0.393*** -0.393*** -0.392*** -0.259*** -0.260*** -0.263***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.061) (0.063) (0.062)
Malei -0.071** -0.066** -0.067** -0.046
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Ageit -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Carbon Emissionsjt -0.017* -0.016* -0.010 -0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Urban Populationjt -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Educationjt -0.011** -0.011** -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 37,277 37,277 37,277 37,277 37,277 37,277 37,277
R-squared 0.360 0.361 0.423 0.437 0.022 0.022 0.125
Test Senate3it× Republicanit = 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.045 0.106 0.109 0.095
Senate12it× Republicanit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when
senator i from state j voted pro environment on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1971-2012. ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 2 reports the results for votes on environmental regulations. As expected,
Democratic senators do not change their voting behavior over time (the coefficient of
the interaction Senate3it × Democratit is never significant). By contrast, Republican
senators are more likely to vote pro environment when they are close to re-election:
the estimated coefficient λ2 and λ3 are both negative and significants (i.e. Republican
senators are less environmentally friendly than Democratic senators), but the coefficient
of the interaction term Senate3it × Republicanit is significantly smaller in absolute terms
29If we exclude the state fixed effects from the specification in column 2, the coefficient of the
variable Educationjt remains negative and significant (at the 1% level), the coefficient of Gun Magazine
Subscriptionsjt becomes positive and significant (at the 1% level), while the coefficient of Violent Crime
Ratejt is not significant.
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than the coefficient of Senate12 × Republicanit in most specifications (see the test at
the bottom of the table). These results are in line with the first prediction of our
model: when it comes to environmental regulations, only Republican senators face a
tradeoff between their preferences or those of their party (which lead them to vote
against regulations at the beginning of their terms) and their re-election motives (which
lead them to vote in line with the preferences of the green single-issue minority at the
end of their terms).
The estimates of Table 2 imply that election proximity increases the probability
of Republican senators voting pro environment by around 2 to 2.4 percentage points
(when comparing across senators) and by between 1.2 and 1.4 percentage points (when
exploiting only within-senator variation). Senator Wayne Allard (R-CO) provides an
example of flip flopping on environmental regulations: he voted pro environment only
10 times out of 108, and this happened during the 105th Congress (when he belonged
to the third generation), and in the 109th and 110th Congress (when he belonged to the
second and third generation, respectively).
Concerning the other controls, the results of Table 2 indicate that male legislators
are less likely to vote in favor of environmental regulations, in line with earlier findings in
the literature on the political economy of environmental policy (Fredriksson and Wang,
2011). Of the constituency characteristics, the estimated coefficients of the variables
Educationjt and Carbon Emissionsjt are negative and significant in the specifications
of columns 2 and 3, suggesting that representatives of states that become more edu-
cated and experience an increase in pollution are less likely to support environmental
regulations.30
When it comes to votes on reproductive rights, the evidence in Table 3 is again very
supportive of the first prediction of our theoretical model. In the case of regulations
related to reproductive rights, no politician should face a tradeoff between policy pref-
erences and re-election motives, due to the presence of strong pro-choice and pro-life
minorities. We would thus expect senators of both parties to vote according to their
policy preferences throughout their terms. Indeed, the results in Table 3 show that
Republicans are less likely to vote pro choice than Democrats (the coefficients of the
interactions Senate3it × Republicanit and Senate12 × Republicanit are negative and sig-
30These results exploit only within-state variation. If we exclude the state fixed effects from the
specification in column 2, the coefficient of Educationjt becomes positive and significant (at the 1%
level), while the coefficient of the variable Carbon Emissionsjt remains negative and significant (at the
5% level); the coefficient of Urbanjt is not significant.
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nificant), but election proximity has no significant impact on their voting behavior (in all
specifications, the coefficient of Senate3it × Democratit is very small and insignificant,
and the test at the bottom of the table is also insignificant).
Table 3
The impact of election proximity on votes on reproductive rights,
party differences
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.033 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Senate3it× Republicanit -0.735*** -0.738*** -0.738*** -0.743*** -0.055 -0.050 -0.053
(0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.067)
Senate12it× Republicanit -0.737*** -0.739*** -0.739*** -0.738*** -0.049 -0.043 -0.047
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.058) (0.057) (0.061)
Malei -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.106**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.052)
Ageit 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Religious Supportersjt 0.424 0.421 0.261 0.261
(0.369) (0.373) (0.313) (0.316)
Abortionsjt -0.001 -0.001 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educationjt -0.009* -0.009* 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995
R-squared 0.730 0.731 0.747 0.770 0.020 0.020 0.098
Test Senate3it× Republicanit = 0.888 0.944 0.963 0.721 0.574 0.565 0.550
Senate12it× Republicanit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when
senator i from state j voted pro environment on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1997-2012. ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Regarding the auxiliary regressors, only the coefficient of the variable Malei is sig-
nificant. Its negative sign indicates that male senators are less likely to vote pro choice,
confirming previous findings in the literature on reproductive rights (Swers, 1998). Of
the constituency characteristics, only Educationjt has a significant (negative) effect in
the specification of column 2.31
31If we exclude the state fixed effects from the same specification, the coefficient of Educationjt
becomes positive and significant (at the 1% level), the coefficient of Religious Supportersjt becomes
negative and significant (at the 10% level), while the coefficient of Abortionsjt remains insignificant.
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Summing up, the results of Tables 1-3 confirm that election proximity has a pro-
gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators.
As expected, senators’ voting behavior on reproductive rights is instead unaffected by
election proximity. These results are identified by comparing the behavior of different
senators voting on the same legislation, as well as the behavior of individual senators
voting on different legislations.
In our analysis so far, we have allowed the party affiliation variable to be time varying,
given that a few senators in our sample changed from one party to the other (Ben
Nighthorse Campbell, Jim Jeffords, Richard Shelby and Arlen Specter), while others
switched from one of the parties to being independent (e.g. Joe Lieberman and Bernard
Sanders). In Tables A-2-A-4 in the Appendix, we have verified that the results of Tables
1-3 continue to hold if we drop from our sample the senators who switched parties.
Compared to our benchmark regression, the main difference is that we can no longer
identify differences in parties’ stances on gun control, environment and reproductive
rights in the specifications that include senator fixed effects (columns 5-7). However, the
results confirm the first prediction of our theoretical model: only Democratic senators
flip flop on gun control, becoming more pro gun as they approach re-election; only
Republican senators flip flop on the environment, becoming “greener” as they approach
re-election; and election proximity has no significant effect on the voting behavior of
senators from either party when it comes to votes on reproductive rights.32
5.2 Re-election motives
Having found strong support for the first prediction of our model, we consider the second
prediction, using variation in the voting behavior of retiring vs. non-retiring senators to
verify whether re-election motives are the reason behind the flip-flopping documented
in Table 1 (for Democrats voting on gun control) and Table 2 (for Republicans voting
on environment).
To assess the validity of Prediction 2, we verify that flip-flopping only arises for
senators who are seeking re-election, but not for those retiring. We focus on Democrats
voting on gun control regulations and Republicans voting on environmental regulations
32The results reported in columns 5-7 of Table A-3 are a bit weaker than the corresponding results
in our benchmark regressions (the coefficient of the interaction term Senate3it× Republicanit is not
significant at conventional levels). However, the results reported in columns 1-4 confirm that election
proximity makes Republican senators more likely to support environmental regulations. Moreover,
when focusing on senators who are seeking re-election, even the within-senator specifications provide
strong support for Prediction 1 (see Table A-6).
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and estimate the following linear probability model:
V oteijvt = λ0 + λ1 Senate3it × Not Retiringit
+λ2 Senate12it × Retiringit + λ3 Senate3it × Retiringit
λ5 Xit + λ3 Wjt + δj + δt + ijvt (10)
Our theoretical model suggests that λ1 should be positive and significant, as non-
retiring Democratic (Republican) senators become more pro gun (environment), while
λ2 should not be significantly different from λ3.
Table 4
The impact of election proximity on Democrats voting on gun regulations,
seeking re-election vs retiring
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Not Retiringit 0.097** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.086* 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.118***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
Senate3it× Retiringit -0.161 -0.185 -0.184 -0.000 -0.128 -0.199 -0.198
(0.154) (0.154) (0.155) (0.037) (0.259) (0.252) (0.253)
Senate12it× Retiringit -0.011 -0.052 -0.049 -0.077 -0.062 -0.077 -0.074
(0.095) (0.093) (0.094) (0.050) (0.193) (0.187) (0.188)
Malei 0.037 0.049 0.049 0.089
(0.072) (0.075) (0.076) (0.129)
Ageit -0.004* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt -0.001 -0.001 -0.052** -0.051**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025)
Violent Crime Ratejt 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Educationjt -0.037** -0.037** -0.051** -0.051**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 668 668 668 668 668 668 668
R-squared 0.526 0.535 0.552 0.733 0.302 0.332 0.359
Test Senate3it× Retiringit = 0.224 0.288 0.288 0.134 0.703 0.481 0.478
Senate12it× Retiringit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when
senator i from state j voted pro gun on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1994-2012. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions on gun votes for Democratic senators.
Independently of the chosen specification, we find strong support for our second predic-
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tion, as non-retiring Democrats facing re-election are about 10 percentage points more
likely to vote pro gun than non-retiring Democratic senators in early generations (i.e.
the omitted category).
As for the other control variables, there is systematic evidence that the level of
education of senators’ constituencies increases their support for gun regulations. Crime
and magazine subscriptions are instead only significant in the specifications that include
senator dummies.
Table 5
The impact of election proximity on Republicans voting on environmental regulations,
seeking re-election vs retiring
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Not Retiringit 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.024* 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Senate3it× Retiringit -0.040 -0.039 -0.037 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.048) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Senate12it× Retiringit -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 0.005 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.038) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Malei -0.069* -0.067 -0.069 -0.066
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045)
Ageit -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Carbon Emissionsjt -0.016 -0.015 -0.011 -0.011
(0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Urban Populationjt 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Educationjt -0.011** -0.011** -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 17,514 17,514 17,514 17,514 17,514 17,514 17,514
R-squared 0.259 0.260 0.396 0.354 0.039 0.039 0.223
Test Senate3it× Retiringit = 0.526 0.552 0.694 0.462 0.557 0.530 0.453
Senate12it× Retiringit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when
senator i from state j voted pro environment on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1971-2012. ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Moving to the behavior of Republican senators on environmental policy, the results
of Table 5 show that only Republican senators seeking re-election become “greener” at
the end of their terms. In terms of magnitude, non-retiring Republicans in the third
generation are about 3 percentage points more likely to vote pro environment than
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non-retiring Republicans in early generations (i.e. the omitted category).
The results of Tables 4 and 5 are robust to dropping from our sample senators who
switched party. The results of this robustness checks are reported in Tables A-5 and A-6
in the Appendix. As they approach the end of their term, Democratic senators become
more pro gun and Republican senators become more pro environment, but only if if they
are seeking re-election.
5.3 Heterogeneous effects across states
In line with the first two predictions of our model, the results presented in the two
sections above show that election proximity affects the voting behavior of incumbent
politicians on secondary policy issues. As expected, Democratic (Republican) senators
who are seeking re-election are more likely to vote pro gun (pro environment) at the end
of their terms, while no senator flip flops on reproductive rights votes.
In this section, we assess the validity of the third prediction of our model: Democratic
(Republican) senators should only flip flop on gun control (environment) when the size
of the pro-gun (green) minority in their constituency is neither too small nor too large.
We consider first gun votes. When looking at Democratic senators in our sample, we
find that many are elected in states that are traditionally Democratic leaning, which have
low levels of per capita subscriptions to gun magazines (e.g. California and New Jersey).
However, others are elected in Democratic leaning states (e.g. Oregon or Vermont) and
traditionally Republican leaning states (e.g. Montana and North Dakota) with high
per capita subscriptions to gun magazines.33 Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, there is
considerable spatial variation in per capita subscriptions to gun magazines during our
sample period.
According to the third prediction of our model, Democratic senators should only flip-
flop on gun regulations when the size of the pro-gun minority in their constituency is of
intermediate size; in the alternative scenarios in which the pro-gun minority is smaller
(larger), they should always vote anti gun (pro gun). We would then expect an inverted
U-shaped relationship between the probability that a Democratic senator flip flops and
per capita subscriptions to gun magazines in his or her state. To verify this, we restrict
again our sample to Democratic senators and interact the variable Senate3it with Gun
magazine subscriptionsjt and its square term. Our theory suggests that the estimate for
33Only five states did not have a Democratic senator during our sample period: Idaho, Kansas,
Mississippi, Utah and Wyoming.
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the linear term should be positive, while the square term should have a negative sign.
The results reported in Table 6 strongly support the third prediction of our model:
the coefficient for the linear term is positive and significant, while the coefficient for the
square term is negative and significant. The test at the bottom of the table indicates
that Senate3it and the two interaction terms are jointly significant at 5%.
Table 6
The impact of election proximity on Democrats voting on gun regulations,
by size of the pro-gun minority
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3)
Senate3it -0.140 -0.133 -0.132
(0.144) (0.146) (0.147)
Senate3it× Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 0.047* 0.047* 0.047*
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Senate3it× Gun Magazine Subscriptions2jt -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 0.122** 0.134** 0.135**
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061)
Gun Magazine Subscriptions2jt -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Malei 0.040 0.047 0.047
(0.074) (0.076) (0.078)
Ageit -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Violent Crime Ratejt 0.001* 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Educationjt -0.028 -0.028
(0.022) (0.022)
Year dummies yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes
Vote dummies no no yes
Observations 668 668 668
R-squared 0.525 0.536 0.552
Joint test for Senate3it and interactions (p-value) 0.032 0.023 0.024
Notes: The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted
for clustering at the state level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro
gun on vote v in year t. The variable Gun magazine subscriptionsjt is the sum of subscriptions to American Rifleman
and American Hunter per 1,000 inhabitants. The sample covers the period 1994-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
We provide a graphical representation of these results in Figure 4, based on the
specification of column 2 of Table 6.34 This figure shows the marginal effects for Demo-
cratic senators belonging to Senate3it for different percentiles of the distribution of gun
magazine subscriptions. This allows us to illustrate how the impact of election prox-
imity on senators’ voting behavior varies with the size of the pro-gun minority in their
constituency. Notice that the marginal effects are not significant for the lowest and high-
est percentiles of gun magazine subscriptions, confirming that election proximity has a
34The qualitative results are similar if we use any other specification of Table 6.
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pro-gun effect on Democratic senators only when the size of the pro-gun group in their
constituency is of intermediate size.
Figure 4
The impact of election proximity on Democrats voting on gun regulations,
by size of the pro-gun minority
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Percentile of Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt
Marginal effects 95% Confidence interval
The figure shows average marginal effects for Senate3it, for various percentiles of Gun magazine subscriptionsjt (based
on the estimates of column 3 in Table 6). Error bars are ±95% confidence intervals.
We next examine whether the impact of election proximity on Republicans’ voting
behavior on environment depends on the size green voters in their constituency. To this
purpose, we use data from List and Sturm (2006) on state-level membership in the three
largest environmental organizations (Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra
Club). We then interact the dummy Senate3it with the variable Membership in Green
Organizationsj and its square term. The results are reported in Table 7. In line with
Prediction 3 of our model, the coefficient for the linear interaction term is positive and
significant, while the coefficient for the square term is negative and significant. The test
at the bottom of the table indicates that Senate3it and the two interaction terms are
jointly significant at 1%.
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Table 7
The impact of election proximity on Republicans voting on environmental regulations,
by size of the green minority
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3)
Senate3it -0.078** -0.085** -0.090**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
Senate3it× Membership in Green Organizationsj 0.191*** 0.211*** 0.226***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.071)
Senate3it× Membership in Green Organizations2j -0.069** -0.079** -0.087***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032)
Membership in Green Organizationsj 0.377** 0.472** 0.470**
(0.160) (0.197) (0.198)
Membership in Green Organizations2j -0.009 -0.008 -0.007
(0.073) (0.094) (0.095)
Malei -0.165** -0.166*** -0.169***
(0.066) (0.053) (0.053)
Ageit -0.002* -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Carbon Emissionsjt -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.006)
Urban Populationjt 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Educationjt -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005)
Year dummies yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes
Vote dummies no no yes
Observations 16,855 16,855 16,855
R-squared 0.172 0.191 0.326
Joint test for Senate3it and interactions (p-value) 0.006 0.003 0.002
Notes: The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted
for clustering at the state level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro
environment on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1971-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Figure 5 shows the marginal effects for Republican senators belonging to Senate3it
for different percentiles of membership in green groups, based on the specification of col-
umn 2 of Table 7. The marginal effects are only significant for intermediate percentiles,
although the effect only becomes smaller and insignificant for the top percentiles of mem-
bership in green groups. The results confirm that election proximity has a “greening”
effect on the voting behavior of Republican senators, but only when the green minority
in their constituency is of intermediate size.
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Figure 5
The impact of election proximity on Republicans voting on environmental regulations,
by size of the green minority
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The figure shows average marginal effects for Senate3it, for various percentiles of Membership in Green Organizationsj
(based on the estimates of column 3 in Table 7). Error bars are ±95% confidence intervals.
We have verified that the heterogeneous effect of election proximity across constituen-
cies are not driven by senators who switched party. As it can be seen from Tables A-7
and A-8, even when dropping these senators, we find that the size of the single-issue mi-
nority has a clear non-monotonic effect on the probability that Democrats become more
pro gun and Republicans become more pro environment as they approach re-election.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that minorities of single-issue voters can shape politicians’
choices on the issues that are salient to them. The key idea is that, when it comes to
secondary issues like gun control, environment and reproductive rights, office-motivated
politicians are only accountable to minorities of voters who care intensely about these
issues, knowing that the rest of the electorate will decide whether or not to re-elect them
based on their stance on other policy issues.
To capture this idea, we have described a simple model in which office and policy
motivated politicians are called to support or oppose regulations on gun control, envi-
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ronment and reproductive rights during their terms in office. In this model, politicians
might flip-flop, voting according to their preferences at the beginning of their terms and
in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities at the end of their terms. Election
proximity should affect politicians’ choices on gun control and environment, policy issues
dominated by strong minorities on one side (pro-gun and pro-environment). In partic-
ular, as they approach re-election, Democratic (Republican) politicians should become
more pro gun (pro environment); these effects should only arise for senators who are
seeking re-election and who represent states in which the single-issue minority is of in-
termediate size. Election proximity should have no impact on the choices of Republican
(Democratic) politicians on gun control (environment), since they do not face a conflict
between their policy preferences (or those of their party) and their re-election motives.
Similarly, Republican and Democratic politicians should not flip flop on reproductive
rights, a secondary issue characterized by strong minorities on both sides (pro-choice
and pro-life).
To assess the validity of these predictions, we have studied the voting behavior of
U.S. senators on legislation related to gun control, environment, and reproductive rights.
The staggered structure of the U.S. Senate, in which members serve six-year terms and
one third is up for re-election every two years, allows to compare the voting behavior of
different generations of senators, depending on how close they are to facing re-election.
We obtain three main results. First, as they approach re-election, Democratic senators
are more likely to vote pro gun, while Republican senators are more likely to vote in
favor of environmental regulations. As expected, election proximity has no effect on
senators’ voting behavior on reproductive rights. Second, Democratic (Republican) sen-
ators flip flop on gun control (environment), but only if they are seeking re-election (i.e.
not retiring). Finally, we find evidence of heterogeneous effects across states: election
proximity only affects the voting behavior of Democratic (Republican) senators when
the pro-gun (pro-environment) group in their constituency is neither too small nor too
large. Our results are robust to including a rich set of controls for legislators and their
constituencies, and exploiting variation both across and within senators.
These findings highlight that politicians systematically respond to the interests of
different single-issue voters on different secondary policy issues. The influence of these
voters across several issues gives credence to the argument that multidimensionality of
the policy space does not necessarily impair electoral accountability. Because single-issue
voters see the policy space as unidimensional, they can use voting to punish and reward
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politicians for specific policies, thereby keeping them in check. Instead of a tyranny of
the majority, democracies may thus be aﬄicted by a tyranny of the single-minded.
Our analysis suggests that U.S. congressmen’s choices on secondary issues may often
diverge from what the majority of American citizens want. As stressed in the intro-
duction, a clear example of this gap is the failure of the Senate to pass even mild gun
regulations, which are supported by the overwhelming majority of the electorate. One
might expect to see policy outcomes that reflect the preferences of the median voter in
the sixteen U.S. states that allow for direct initiatives.35 However, there are at least
three reasons to believe that the outcome of such initiatives may not always coincide
with the preferences of the majority of voters. First, there may be a bias in terms of
which propositions end up on the ballot. This is because organizing initiatives is very
costly in terms of both time and money, and single-issue voters may be more willing to
incur such costs.36 Second, direct initiatives are likely to suffer from a bias in turnout,
if single-issue voters are more willing to incur the costs of voting (e.g. spending time to
register, rearranging work schedules, getting to the polls, and gathering information on
the candidates). Finally, initiatives often suffer from framing effects.37
An important avenue for future research is to understand how voters’ preference in-
tensity affects the role of lobby groups. The existing literature has emphasized various
channels through which lobbies may affect policy outcomes, e.g. by offering campaign
contributions to incumbent politicians (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), pledging the
votes of their members (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011), and making it easier for special
interests to have access to politicians and providing issue-specific information to politi-
cians (Blanes-i-Vidal et al., 2012; Bertrand et al., 2014). Our results suggests that the
power of single-issue lobby groups rests in the intensity of their members’ preferences.38
These organizations can play a key role, allowing single-issue voters to keep politicians
35The direct initiative process allows ordinary citizens to draft a petition in the form of a legislative
bill or constitutional amendment. If the petition receives sufficient popular support, the measure is
then placed directly on a ballot, without the need to first submit it to the legislature.
36Organizing an initiative is a complex legal process, involving several steps: 1) preliminary filing
of a proposed petition with a designated state official; 2) review of the petition for conformance with
statutory requirements and, in several states, a review of the language of the proposal; 3) preparation
of a ballot title and summary; 4) circulation of the petition to obtain the required number of signatures
of registered voters, usually a percentage of the votes cast for a statewide office in the preceding general
election; and 5) submission of the petition to the state officials, who must verify the number of signatures.
Organizing a successful initiative is also financially very costly, since it usually requires hiring specialized
firms to run opinion polls before drafting the petition and to collect the required number of signatures.
37See “Gun safety versus gun control,” The Economist, January 24, 2013.
38This is, for example, what was argued about the NRA in a recent article on the New York Times
(“The True Source of the N.R.A.’s Clout: Mobilization, Not Donations,” February 24, 2018).
36
accountable: they provide information to their members about politicians’ choices on
their key issue of interest; and they remind politicians that their members are willing to
cast their votes based on this issue alone.
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Appendix
A-1 Theoretical Appendix
First, it is useful to prove the following four lemmas.
Lemma 1 The strategy (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (0, 1) is an equilibrium iff
γχ2 (npαp − naαa) ≥ θ (ω (0, 0)− ω (0, 1)) ,
npαp − naαa ≥ 0, and
θ (ω (0, 1)− ω (1, 1)) ≥ γχ1 (npαp − naαa) .
These conditions cannot be satisfied for a pro-issue incumbent.
Proof. We have that U (0, 1) ≥ U (0, 0) iff
1
2
+γ
∑
j
nj
(∑
t
χtW tj (0, 1)− u¯j
)
+θ (ω (0, 1)) ≥ 1
2
+γ
∑
j
nj
(∑
t
χtW tj (0, 0)− u¯j
)
+θ (ω (0, 0)) .
This boils down to
γ
(−npαpχ1 − naαaχ2)+ θ (ω (0, 1)) ≥ γ (−npαpχ1p − npαpχ2p)+ θ (ω (0, 0))
and thus
γχ2 (npαp − naαa) ≥ θ (ω (0, 0)− ω (0, 1)) .
Similarly, we have that U (0, 1) ≥ U (1, 0) iff
γ
(−npαpχ1 − naαaχ2)+ θ (ω (0, 1)) ≥ γ (−npαpχ2 − naαaχ1)+ θ (ω (1, 0)) ,
which boils down to
γ
(
χ2 − χ1) (npαp − naαa) ≥ θ (ω (1, 0)− ω (0, 1)) .
Since, ω (1, 0) = ω (0, 1) and (χ2 > χ1), this is satisfied iff
npαp > naαa.
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Finally, U (0, 1) ≥ U (1, 1) iff
γ
(−npαpχ1 − naαaχ2)+ θ (ω (0, 1)) ≥ γ (−naαaχ1 − naαaχ2)+ θ (ω (1, 1)) ,
which simplifies to
θ (ω (0, 1)− ω (1, 1)) ≥ γχ1 (npαp − naαa) .
To prove that these conditions cannot be satisfied for a pro-issue incumbent, first
note that θ (ωp (0, 1)− ωp (1, 1)) < 0. This directly implies that θ (ω (0, 1)− ω (1, 1)) ≥
γχ1 (npαp − naαa) is not compatible with npαp − naαa ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 The strategy (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (1, 0) is an equilibrium iff
γχ1 (npαp − naαa) ≥ θ (ω (0, 0)− ω (1, 0)) ,
npαp − naαa ≤ 0, and
θ (ω (1, 0)− ω (1, 1)) ≥ γχ2 (npαp − naαa) .
These conditions cannot be satisfied for an anti-issue incumbent.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 The strategy (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (0, 0) is an equilibrium iff
θ (ω (0, 0)− ω (0, 1)) ≥ γχ2 (npαp − naαa) ,
θ (ω (0, 0)− ω (1, 0)) ≥ γχ1 (npαp − naαa) , and
θ (ω (0, 0)− ω (1, 1)) ≥ γ (χ1 + χ2) (npαp − naαa) .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 The strategy (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (1, 1) is an equilibrium iff
γχ1 (naαa − npαp) ≤ θ (ω (1, 1)− ω (0, 1)) ,
γχ2 (npαp − naαa) ≥ θ (ω (1, 0)− ω (1, 1)) , and
θ (ω (0, 0)− ω (1, 1)) ≤ γ (χ1 + χ2) (npαp − naαa) .
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
We can now move to the proofs of our main results.
Proof of Proposition 1.
For the anti-issue incumbent, we have
ωa (0, 0)− ωa (1, 1) > ωa (0, 0)− ωa (0, 1) > 0, and
ωa (0, 1)− ωa (1, 1) = ωa (1, 0)− ωa (1, 1) > 0.
Thus, from Lemma 3, we obtain that (0, 0) is an equilibrium iff
θ (ωa (0, 0)− ωa (0, 1)) ≥ γχ2 (npαp − naαa) , and (A-1)
θ (ωa (0, 0)− ωa (1, 1)) ≥ γ
(
χ1 + χ2
)
(npαp − naαa) . (A-2)
From Lemma 1, we obtain that (0, 1) is an equilibrium iff
γχ2 (npαp − naαa) ≥ θ (ωa (0, 0)− ωa (0, 1)) , and (A-3)
θ (ω (0, 1)− ω (1, 1)) ≥ γχ1 (npαp − naαa) . (A-4)
From Lemma 2, we have that (1, 0) is never an equilibrium. Indeed, γχ1 (npαp − naαa) ≥
θ (ωa (0, 0)− ωa (1, 0)) cannot be satisfied when npαp − naαa ≤ 0.
From Lemma 4, we obtain that (1, 1) is an equilibrium iff
γχ1 (npαp − naαa) ≥ θ (ωa (0, 1)− ωa (1, 1)) , and (A-5)
γ
(
χ1 + χ2
)
(npαp − naαa) ≥ θ (ωa (0, 0)− ωa (1, 1)) . (A-6)
We thus have that the behavior of an anti-issue incumbent is always uniquely defined.
Indeed, condition (A-1) contradicts condition (A-3), condition (A-4) contradicts condi-
tion (A-5), and condition (A-2) contradicts condition (A-6).
For (npαp − naαa) = 4h ≥ max{ θ(ωa(0,1)−ωa(1,1))γχ1 , θ(ωa(0,0)−ωa(1,1))γ(χ1+χ2) }, (1, 1) is the equilib-
rium. For 4h ≤ max{ θ(ωa(0,0)−ωa(0,1))
γχ2
, θ(ωa(0,0)−ωa(1,1))
γ(χ1+χ2)
}, (0, 0) is the equilibrium. Flip-
flopping occurs for intermediate values of4h, i.e. when4h ∈
(
θ(ωa(0,0)−ωa(0,1))
γχ2
, θ(ω(0,1)−ω(1,1))
γχ1
)
.
Proof of Proposition 2. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Follows immediately from equation (5).
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A-2 Empirical Appendix
Figure A-1
Lobbying expenditures on different policy issues
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The figure reports yearly lobbying expenditures on six different policy issues. Data are available from 1998, following the
Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995). The data come from the Center for Responsive Politics (http://www.opensecrets.org).
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Figure A-2
Campaign contributions received by Senate members for different policy issues
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The figure reports campaign contributions to U.S. Senators on six different policy issues during the 103rd-114th Congresses.
The data come from the Center for Responsive Politics (http://www.opensecrets.org) and include both contributions
from political action committees (PACs) and from individuals, mapped to industries based on the name of the PAC or
the occupation/employer of the individual donor.
Figure A-3
Campaign contributions received by House members for different policy issues
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The figure reports campaign contributions to U.S. House representatives on six different policy issues during the 103rd-
114th Congresses. The data come from the Center for Responsive Politics (http://www.opensecrets.org) and include
both contributions from political action committees (PACs) and from individuals, mapped to industries based on the
name of the PAC or the occupation/employer of the individual donor.
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Table A-1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Gun control
mean sd. dev. min. max. N
Voteijvt = 1 if senator voted pro-gun 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1363
Senate3it 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 1363
Republicanit 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1363
Malei 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 1363
Ageit 60.91 10.04 39.00 97.00 1363
Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 10.68 5.12 3.38 32.71 1363
Violent Crime Ratejt 426.18 195.21 66.90 961.40 1363
Educationjt 25.45 4.79 15.90 40.40 1363
Panel B: Environment
mean sd. dev. min. max. N
Voteijvt = 1 if senator voted pro-environment 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 37277
Senate3it 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 37277
Republicanit 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 37277
Malei 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 37277
Ageit 58.38 10.37 31.00 100.00 37277
Membership in Green Organizationsjt 0.85 0.36 0.25 2.02 35830
Carbon Emissionsjt 2.44 1.72 0.56 13.25 37277
Urban Populationjt 69.40 14.67 32.20 95.12 37277
Educationjt 20.16 6.32 7.11 39.30 37277
Panel C: Abortion
mean sd. dev. min. max. N
Voteijvt = 1 if senator voted pro-choice 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 4995
Senate3it 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 4995
Republicanit 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 4995
Malei 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 4995
Ageit 60.88 10.03 39.00 100.00 4995
Abortionsjt 24.70 40.04 0.07 237.39 4995
Religious Supportersjt 0.50 0.10 0.28 0.79 4995
Educationjt 25.74 4.87 14.60 40.40 4995
See Section 4 for definitions and sources. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for all variables included in
regressions on gun control (Tables 1, 4 and 6). Panel B reports descriptive statistics for all variables included
in regressions on environment (Tables 2, 5 and 7). Panel C reports descriptive statistics for all variables
included in regressions on abortion (Table 3). In Panel B, the variable Membership in Green Organizationsj
is not available for Alaska and Hawaii.
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Table A-2
The impact of election proximity on votes on gun regulations,
party differences, dropping party switchers
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit 0.063* 0.064* 0.062 0.076* 0.101** 0.101** 0.097**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Senate3it× Republicanit 0.475*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.484*** 0.032 0.028 0.028
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.064) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Senate12it× Republicanit 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.458***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.061)
Malei 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.049
(0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.060)
Ageit -0.003 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 0.011 0.011 -0.016 -0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Violent Crime Ratejt 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Educationjt -0.010 -0.010 -0.021* -0.020*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332
R-squared 0.593 0.596 0.645 0.699 0.228 0.235 0.347
Test Senate3it× Republicanit = 0.113 0.142 0.143 0.367
Senate12it× Republicanit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the senator level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro gun on vote v
in year t. The sample covers the period 1994-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Table A-3
The impact of election proximity on votes on environmental regulations
party differences’, dropping party switchers
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Senate3it× Republicanit -0.368*** -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.373*** 0.012 0.012 0.013
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Senate12it× Republicanit -0.391*** -0.396*** -0.396*** -0.393***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028)
Malei -0.072** -0.068** -0.068** -0.044
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Ageit -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Carbon Emissionsjt -0.017* -0.017* -0.011 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Urban Populationjt 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Educationjt -0.012** -0.012** -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 36,561 36,561 36,561 36,561 36,561 36,561 36,561
R-squared 0.360 0.362 0.423 0.439 0.020 0.021 0.124
Test Senate3it× Republicanit = 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.049
Senate12it× Republicanit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the senator level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro environment
on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1971-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Table A-4
The impact of election proximity on votes on reproductive rights,
party differences, dropping party switchers
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.030 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Senate3it× Republicanit -0.757*** -0.759*** -0.759*** -0.769*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.062) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Senate12it× Republicanit -0.753*** -0.754*** -0.754*** -0.753***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.061)
Malei -0.098** -0.097** -0.097** -0.090*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.050)
Ageit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Abortionsjt -0.000 -0.000 0.002** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Religious Supportersjt 0.282 0.278 0.286 0.285
(0.361) (0.366) (0.272) (0.276)
Educationjt -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 4,517 4,517 4,517 4,517 4,517 4,517 4,517
R-squared 0.741 0.742 0.759 0.778 0.018 0.019 0.098
Test Senate3it× Republicanit = 0.750 0.718 0.702 0.333
Senate12it× Republicanit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the senator level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro environment
on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1997-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Table A-5
The impact of election proximity on Democrats voting on gun regulations,
seeking re-election vs retiring, dropping party switchers
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Not Retiringit 0.097** 0.097*** 0.097** 0.085* 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.118***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
Senate3it× Retiringit -0.174 -0.204 -0.203 -0.002 -0.128 -0.198 -0.197
(0.162) (0.163) (0.164) (0.042) (0.259) (0.252) (0.253)
Senate12it× Retiringit -0.015 -0.057 -0.054 -0.078 -0.062 -0.077 -0.074
(0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.051) (0.193) (0.187) (0.188)
Malei 0.039 0.051 0.051 0.090
(0.072) (0.075) (0.076) (0.129)
Ageit -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt -0.001 -0.001 -0.052** -0.051**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025)
Violent Crime Ratejt 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Educationjt -0.038** -0.038** -0.051** -0.051**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663 663
R-squared 0.521 0.531 0.548 0.729 0.300 0.330 0.357
Test Senate3it× Retiringit = 0.211 0.256 0.257 0.175 0.703 0.482 0.479
Senate12it× Retiringit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the senator level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro environment
on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1997-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Table A-6
The impact of election proximity on Republicans voting on environmental regulations,
seeking re-election vs retiring, dropping party switchers
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Not Retiringit 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Senate3it× Retiringit -0.035 -0.033 -0.030 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.042) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Senate12it× Retiringit -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 0.011 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Malei -0.070* -0.068* -0.070* -0.058
(0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042)
Ageit -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Carbon Emissionsjt -0.014 -0.014 -0.010 -0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Urban Populationjt 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Educationjt -0.013*** -0.013** -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 16,944 16,944 16,944 16,944 16,944 16,944 16,944
R-squared 0.257 0.259 0.397 0.355 0.040 0.040 0.226
Test Senate3it× Retiringit = 0.555 0.603 0.756 0.488 0.562 0.529 0.448
Senate12it× Retiringit (p-value)
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the senator level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro environment
on vote v in year t. The sample covers the period 1997-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Table A-7
The impact of election proximity on Democrats,
by size of the pro-gun minority, dropping party switchers
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3)
Senate3it -0.131 -0.124 -0.122
(0.145) (0.147) (0.148)
Senate3it× Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 0.045* 0.046* 0.045*
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Senate3it× Gun Magazine Subscriptions2jt -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 0.122** 0.133** 0.135**
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061)
Gun Magazine Subscriptions2jt -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Malei 0.042 0.049 0.050
(0.074) (0.076) (0.078)
Ageit -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Violent Crime Ratejt 0.001* 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Educationjt -0.028 -0.028
(0.022) (0.022)
Year dummies yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes
Vote dummies no no yes
Observations 663 663 663
R-squared 0.521 0.531 0.548
Joint test for Senate3it and interactions (p-value) 0.036 0.026 0.026
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro gun on vote v
in year t. The variable Gun magazine subscriptionsjt is the sum of subscriptions to American Rifleman and American
Hunter per 1,000 inhabitants. The sample covers the period 1994-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table A-8
The impact of election proximity on Republicans voting on environmental regulations,
by size of the green minority, dropping party switchers
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3)
Senate3it -0.110*** -0.114*** -0.120***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038)
Senate3it× Membership in Green Organizationsj 0.281*** 0.291*** 0.309***
(0.079) (0.081) (0.086)
Senate3it× Membership in Green Organizations2j -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.133***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.044)
Membership in Green Organizationsj 0.382** 0.484** 0.478**
(0.171) (0.210) (0.211)
Membership in Green Organizations2j -0.014 -0.021 -0.018
(0.084) (0.104) (0.104)
Malei -0.169** -0.171*** -0.174***
(0.066) (0.054) (0.054)
Ageit -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Carbon Emissionsjt -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.006)
Urban Populationjt 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Educationjt -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.005) (0.005)
Year dummies yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes
Vote dummies no no yes
Observations 16,285 16,285 16,285
R-squared 0.171 0.188 0.326
Joint test for Senate3it and interactions (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro gun on vote v
in year t. The variable Gun magazine subscriptionsjt is the sum of subscriptions to American Rifleman and American
Hunter per 1,000 inhabitants. The sample covers the period 1994-2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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